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## **Vision of global order in a “post-european age”.**

Carl Schmitt, Raymond Aron and the civil servant  
of the world spirit

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*Carl Schmitt, Raymond Aron e il funzionario dello Spirito del mondo.*



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## **Vision of global order in a “post-european age”.**

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Carl Schmitt, Raymond Aron and the civil servant of the world spirit.

Verborgen bleibt der liebe gott  
die ganze welt wird melting pot.

Carl Schmitt, 1957

This essay seeks to reconstruct a distinctly European conversation about the continent’s fate in the period after the Second World War. During the late 1940s and 1950s, a large number of intellectuals sought to come to terms with what George Lichtheim has called the «post-European age», that is, a new global politics which, above all, was rapidly leading to Europe’s marginalization<sup>1</sup>. In particular, they sought to address what appeared as a twin challenge: the simultaneous fragmentation of political space in the process of decolonization, on the one hand, and, on the other, the supposed homogenization of world politics through the emergence of ever larger «power blocs». Behind these challenges ultimately loomed the prospect of the «world state», a state which was very unlikely to be dominated by Europe.

A leading, but quite often clandestine, voice in this «post-European conversation» was Carl Schmitt, the officially disgraced «Crown Jurist of the Third Reich». While for almost all European intellectuals this conversation was a form of compensation for the decline of European elites and the very real loss of European political power, it especially served Schmitt’s purpose of dissolving the Nazi era in world-historical reflections about the end of the European state-system. Yet, Schmitt’s defence of a new multipolar world order was not merely an indirect *apologia pro sua vita*, as has sometimes been claimed. Rather, it was intimately bound up with Schmitt’s critique of liberalism as a principle of creating lasting world order, as well as his peculiar concept of the political.

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1 G. Lichtheim, *Europe in the Twentieth Century*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972.

Here I seek not just to reconstruct Schmitt's post-war reflections on global order, but also his extensive engagement with two French thinkers who offered rival visions of the international system at mid-century. Alexandre Kojève was arguably the most sophisticated advocate of a «world state» in the 1950s and 1960s – much more so than Schmitt's old friend (and sometime adversary) Ernst Jünger, on whom this essay will touch briefly. Raymond Aron, on the other hand, was perhaps the leading proponent of a liberal, «realist» theory of international relations that ostensibly bore much resemblance to Schmitt's thought. Yet, an analysis of the cross-cutting intellectual exchanges between all three needs to operate on two levels: it needs to examine not only the pictures of «post-European» international relations which they were painting, but also relate these pictures to their underlying definitions of the political.

## **Location, Law and Order**

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Carl Schmitt had begun to formulate a vision of a multipolar world order of great spaces or *Grossräume* in the early 1940s, but only published his magnum opus on the topic, *The Nomos of the Earth*, in 1950. Obviously parts of what had still seamlessly fitted into his vision for a Nazi-dominated great space among other empires with global reach, had to be revised to become palatable in the post-war period. Yet *Nomos of the Earth* was to remain the touchstone for all his post-war reflections – not least because it allowed him to shift the level of discussion away from the German past and domestic politics to more lofty world-historical and even mythical ruminations. When a number of his admirers sought to publish a collection of his political writings in the early 1970s, he insisted that they start with *Nomos* and include only post-war writings – as if his earlier, more open antiliberalism had not remained the foundation on which his post-war vision of global order was erected.

In what is probably his most idiosyncratic book, Schmitt argued on many different levels, frequently mixing traditional historical and legal analysis with dubious etymological claims and barely hidden resentments towards the victors of the Second World War. Yet, through it all ran an argument against the dangers of global unification under the auspices of the Anglo-American powers based on commerce and control of the seas.

Schmitt began with myth, namely with the startling claim that the Earth was the mother of law and that the great *Ur-acts* of law-creation had all taken place on a particular soil: the occupation of land, the foundation of cities as well as the

foundation of colonies<sup>2</sup>. The occupation of land was the most fundamental of these acts. The appropriation of land, or taking of land, as Schmitt literally called it, established a clear outside and inside. This line then in turn could become the basis for distinctions such as public and private law as well as political domination and private property<sup>3</sup>. Appropriating land therefore constituted the beginning of a 'concrete order', but it also was the only way of «putting down roots in the realm of meaning in history»<sup>4</sup>. Localisation or *Ortung*, order or *Ordnung*, and meaning then became inextricably connected – while the separation of *Ortung* and *Ordnung* would necessarily cause not only dislocation – literally – but also political and moral disorientation<sup>5</sup>. Utopianism – understood as the absence of *topos* or *Ortung* and therefore as the absence of the concrete unity of measure, order and law -- would also necessarily have to be a form of nihilism. The proper conjunction of place, law and order, on the other hand, Schmitt termed *Nomos*<sup>6</sup>.

Schmitt chose an – to say the least – unorthodox interpretation of the ancient Greek word to avoid what he saw as the positivist connotations of the German word *Gesetz*, which appeared to imply a notion of human positing (of law). Nevertheless, for all its mythical and etymological baggage, the notion of *Nomos* was not by itself necessarily a kind of mysticism of the soil – after all, a *Nomos* was a human creation, a measure willed by those capable of establishing effective distinctions between inside and outside.

Schmitt then moved on to a brief world history centred on the notion of *Nomos*. He outlined a succession of concrete orders from the ancient *polis* to the medieval republics and finally to the creation of the state and the *ius publicum Europaeum*, that is, European, state-centric international law, in the sixteenth century. This creation, Schmitt argued, had been dependent on the simultaneous discovery of the New World. The major powers, according to Schmitt, could only manage to contain warfare on the European continent, because the rest of the globe remained available for unrestrained warfare. Here Schmitt celebrated a form of war, modelled on the duel, which supposedly did not morally defame or discriminate against the enemy, as

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2 C. Schmitt, *Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum* 1950, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1997, p. 15.

3 *Ibidem*, p. 17.

4 *Ibidem*, p. 19.

5 *Ibidem*, p. 36.

6 As Raphael Gross has shown, right-wing Protestant political theologians had already developed a notion of Volk-nomos in the inter-war period. See R. Gross, *Carl Schmitt und die Juden: Eine deutsche Rechtslehre*, Frankfurt/Main, Suhrkamp, 2000, pp. 83-112.

a unique and humane achievement. In this scheme, the silencing of the theologians had led to a humanization of warfare, as the *justa causa* had been replaced by the *justus hostis*. In other words, war based on conviction and confession had given way to war based on calculable interest and known legal instruments. This new Eurocentric *Nomos*, according to Schmitt, had preserved peace inside the various strong states that were erected in the early modern period and simultaneously minimized cruelty in inter-state relations. Yet this – in Schmitt's eyes extraordinary – creation of Occidental rationalism crucially depended on the availability of a space outside Europe which could be freely exploited and fought over *hors la loi*. The culturally homogeneous system of sovereign European states presupposed an outside space open to conquest and colonization. In short, the exceptions to the «normality» of the system – privateers, for instance – had to be located on the outside, in a «wild», lawless zone.

According to Schmitt, the civilizational achievement of what Vattel had called «la guerre en forme» was destroyed with the rise of England as a maritime power. England, not by accident also the first industrial society, now made the sea the basis of a new global order. Where the other European powers had appropriated ever more land, England at one point appropriated the sea itself<sup>7</sup>. England's emerging *thalassocracy* was based on the indirect exercise of power through commerce and credits, and the direct exercise of power in maritime warfare, which, according to Schmitt, by its nature could not be contained. A sea-based system was nothing less than unnatural: after all, as Schmitt claimed, 'the sea is alien to man and hostile. It is not a living space [*Lebensraum*] of man<sup>8</sup>.

Eventually Anglo-American imperialism – under the cover of a new universalist legal vocabulary – destroyed the old *ius publicum Europeum* and reintroduced a discriminating concept of enmity centred on the notion of just war. Britain, the United States and their allies were erecting a new world order which was not properly «grounded» and therefore lacked clear lines and demarcations. Schmitt held that a «loosening of the order centred on the nation-state without a clear organisation of great spaces or even a world-organisation» could only produce «smudged spaces» and «pseudo fronts».<sup>9</sup> The clearest sign of this smudging and the resultant ambiguity was of course the fact that both England and the United States appeared to be simultaneously in and apart from Europe. At the same time, Schmitt

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7 C. Schmitt, *Gespräche über die Macht und den Zugang zum Machthaber/Gespräch über den neuen Raum*, Berlin, Akademie, 1994, p. 53.

8 *Ibidem*, p. 38.

9 C. Schmitt, *Glossarium*, ed. Eberhard Freiherr von Medem, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1991, cit., p. 9.

was indignant that «America» now claimed to embody the «true Europe» as the «stronghold of law and liberty». As he put it, «the old Europe, like old Asia and old Africa, was put on the side as the past. Old and new...are here not only measures of condemnation, but also of distribution, of *Ordnung* and *Ortung*»<sup>10</sup>.

Moreover, as Schmitt had already noted in his diary in 1947, the traditional state had meant sovereignty capable of a decision to end civil war – global domination, on the other hand, meant almost the opposite. It amounted to a «combination of war according to international law and civil war»<sup>11</sup>. After all, the new world order failed clearly to externalize the exception – instead internalizing a potential permanent state of exception. It also broke the link between order and location, the only guarantee of meaning in world politics. *Nomos*, in short, was replaced by nihilism.

Schmitt instead advocated a proper «pluriversum» of great spaces which also remained the proper repository for «agonalism», that is, a concept of enmity that did not imply the annihilation of the enemy. Compared to the Anglo-American «ethical-moral conception of enmity», agonalism and its non-discriminating treatment of the enemy fared much better – even from a moral point of view, according to Schmitt.<sup>12</sup>

Essentially, Schmitt claimed that even if Britain and the United States somehow succeeded in establishing a proper world order, an order without plurality would also mean the end of the political. Here Schmitt wavered between finding such a situation completely inconceivable and finding it merely deeply undesirable. Yet, he soon was to come across an utterly un-American and un-English figure who proposed a highly sophisticated philosophical account precisely of what he feared most.

## **Kojève's Comedy**

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In 1967, a year before his death, Alexandre Kojève travelled from Beijing to address the students rebelling in West Berlin. The main advice of the philosopher-turned-*éminence grise* of the French civil service consisted in the instruction to learn Greek. On this occasion, he mentioned to the German-Jewish philosopher Jacob Taubes with characteristic nonchalance that he was planning to visit Carl Schmitt. In

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10 C. Schmitt, *Nomos*, cit., p. 266.

11 C. Schmitt, *Glossarium*, cit., p. 3.

12 *Ibidem*, p. 8.

response to Taubes's surprise, Kojève claimed that Schmitt was «the only one with whom it was worth talking» in Germany<sup>13</sup>. In one sense, it was not surprising that Kojève and Schmitt would sooner or later correspond and meet. Kojève – like Schmitt a highly cultivated man – knew how to capture not only ideas, but also fellow intellectuals who would be turned into life-long disciples. Like Schmitt, he fascinated others not least by constructing myths around his past and his own personality<sup>14</sup>. As in Schmitt's case, there always remained traces of the bohemian character he had once been in his youth, before he opted for life in academia and, ultimately, for putting his services at the disposal of the French state. And finally, like Schmitt, Kojève had something about him that led others to compare him to the Grand Inquisitor, even to Mephistopheles – while others saw in him rather a mixture of Dostoevsky's Ivan Karamazov and Stavrogin<sup>15</sup>.

Twenty years before his first encounter with Schmitt, Kojève had begun almost single-handedly to change French philosophical life through his seminars on Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which he held in the *École pratique des hautes études*. He convinced a whole generation of intellectuals that «it is possible that the future of the world, and therefore the meaning and direction of the present and the significance of the past, depends in the final analysis on the way in which we interpret Hegelian texts today»<sup>16</sup>. That generation came to be known as the 'generation of the three H's' – thanks to Kojève, one of the three H's happened to be Hegel (with Heidegger and Husserl as the other two)<sup>17</sup>.

Kojève had hardly been predestined for this role. He was born as Alexander Kojevnikov in Moscow in 1902, into a cosmopolitan bourgeois family – the artist Vassily Kandinsky was his uncle. Despite the fact that he was arrested for racketeering by the Cheka in 1918, he became an ardent supporter of the Russian Revolution – the only reason he left for the West was that Moscow University denied him entry in 1919 because of his bourgeois background. Kojève ended up in Heidelberg, where he led the life of a gentleman scholar, a highly sophisticated amateur dilettante who happened to know more than the professionals in subjects ranging from Sanskrit to Russian philosophy. Eventually, this Russian dandy wrote a

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13 J. Taubes, *Ad Carl Schmitt: Gegenstrebiges Fügung*, Berlin, Merve, 1987, p. 24.

14 Many of these myths have been recounted – and, to some extent, dispelled – in D. Auffret's *Alexandre Kojève: La Philosophie, l'État, la fin de l'Histoire*, Paris, Grasset, 1990.

15 *Ibidem*, p. 19.

16 Quoted by M. S. Roth, *Knowing and History: Appropriations of Hegel in Twentieth-Century France*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1988, p. 118.

dissertation with Karl Jaspers, before moving to Paris to squander his considerable wealth on a luxurious life with his young Russian wife. All this ended in 1930, after Kojève lost most of his money in the stock market crash, where he had imprudently bought shares of the cheese maker *La vache qui rit*. Subsequently, he had to find employment as a librarian, settle in a modest suburb of the French capital and, from then on, would meet students and visitors only in cafes, appearing to his admirers like a «man without qualities»<sup>18</sup>. But in fact, he was not so much a man without qualities as man with too many – and often contradictory – qualities: the perceptive critic of Kandinsky counted Franz Stuck among his favourite painters; married to a Jew, he had only contempt for Zionism and for Israel; as an eventual anti-Bolshevik, he remained an admirer of Stalin well into the fifties (with some suspecting that he was in fact working for the KGB)<sup>19</sup>.

From 1933 to 1939, every Monday at 5.30 in the afternoon, Kojève offered his seminar on Hegel – a seminar located very much on the periphery of prestigious French university life, but attended by, among others, Raymond Aron, Georges Bataille, André Breton, Jacques Lacan and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Kojève, however, never became a regular French professor. Instead, after the War, he embarked on a career as a bureaucrat for the French government. He was helped by Robert Marjolin, who had attended Kojève's seminar. Marjolin had been de Gaulle's economic adviser in London and after the War became a high-ranking administrator for trade in the French Economic Ministry as well as a major figure in the construction of the European Community. He enabled Kojève to join a group of high-minded technocrats working for European economic unification. As a young bureaucrat, the later French prime minister Raymond Barre observed Kojève as an «excellent negotiator for France», even as the «terror of other trade delegations», who, on the other hand, seemed to retain considerable inner distance to his tough-minded diplomacy. One of his mottos, according to Barre, was: «life is a comedy – but we have to act seriously in it»<sup>20</sup>.

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17 See also V. Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy*, trans. L. Scott-Fox, J. M. Harding, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1980, pp. 9-54.

18 According to Armin Mohler in P. Tommissen (ed.), *Schmittiana, Vol. VI*, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1998, p. 48.

19 F. P. Ingold, Asket, *Dandy, Machtmensch*, in «Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung», 23rd May 2001.

20 Barre in Auffret, *Alexandre Kojève*, cit., pp. 418-417.



Sometimes Kojève's own philosophy appeared like a comedy - although the stakes were deadly serious throughout<sup>21</sup>. Following Hegel, he argued that history would have come to an end when all bloody revolutions and battles for prestige and recognition had been played out. In the meantime, the dialectic of master and slave, in which the former took away the autonomy of the latter without actually killing him, would repeat itself out again and again. For Kojève, unlike for Hegel, history was exclusively the «history of the working slave». Unlike the master, who remained frozen in his victory with nobody to give him proper recognition, the slave desired «change, transcendence, transformation, education». The slave would thus drive technological progress and acquire an increasingly refined understanding of the world - while the master, having attained humanity through risking death in his struggle for recognition, would in all other respects remain on the level of animal existence. At the end of this largely impersonal process the opposition between master and slave, however, would be overcome. It was at this point that a «universal homogeneous state» would emerge, in which all human needs were satisfied. There would no longer be any opposition nor even anything external to the state. Such a state would see the reign of the «Sunday of life», as Kojève's friend, the writer Raymond Queneau, put it in a novel with the same title<sup>22</sup>. It was the vision of universal peace in which the political had vanished alongside all more profound human passions - politics had been replaced by free-wheeling play among «happy men». But such happy men were not only Nietzschean «last men» - they were no longer properly men at all. As Kojève put it in point of fact, the end of human Time, or History - that is, the definitive annihilation of Man properly speaking, or of the free and historical Individual - means quite simply the cessation of Action in the full sense of the term. Practically, this means the disappearance of wars and bloody revolutions. And also the disappearance of Philosophy; for since Man himself no longer changes essentially, there is no longer any reason to change (true) principles which are at the basis of his understanding of the world and of himself. But all the rest can be preserved indefinitely; art, love, play, etc.; in short everything that makes man happy<sup>23</sup>.

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21 See also the perceptive essay by G. Tihanov, *Regimes of Modernity at the Dawn of Globalization: Carl Schmitt and Alexander Kojève*, in D. Kadir, D. Löbbermann (eds.), *Other Modernisms in an Age of Globalization*, Heidelberg, C. F. Winter, 2002, pp. 75-93.

22 R. Queneau, *Le dimanche de la vie*, Paris, Gallimard, 1951.

23 A. Kojève, *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel: Leçons sur la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit professées de 1933 à 1939 à l'École des Hautes-Études 1902-1968*, ed. Raymond Queneau, Paris, Gallimard, 1947, p. 435.

## Globalizing Politics or Globalizing Play

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Schmitt first took notice of Kojève in the early 1950s, and in due course contacted him in the middle of the decade, casting his net for fellow intellectuals to take part in the «post-European conversation» in which he was particularly interested. He persuaded Kojève to give a talk in front of the «Rhein-Ruhr Club» in Düsseldorf, which invited speakers ranging from the banker Hermann Josef Abs to the editor of the news magazine *Der Spiegel*, Rudolf Augstein, and Hannah Arendt. On 16<sup>th</sup> January 1957, Kojève held forth in front of major industrialists on «Colonialism from a European perspective» – an event that, as Schmitt wrote to Ernst Jünger, was attended by at least «twenty first-rate people» from among his «young friends»<sup>24</sup>.

Schmitt and Kojève turned out to be friendly philosophical adversaries, who could easily find a common, sometimes excessively polite language. Yet, this language hid the fact that their visions of the world were in almost all aspects diametrically opposed. When he first contacted Kojève, Schmitt had just written his essay on «Appropriation – Distribution – Production», in which he argued that this three-step approach characterized the history of the world under the sign of *Nomos*.<sup>25</sup> Kojève immediately countered that there had been no genuine land 'appropriation' since Napoleon. In fact, he admitted that Hegel had been even more right than he had initially thought<sup>26</sup>. He confessed to Schmitt that in his pre-war seminars he had always thought «Stalin» when he read Napoleon. He further admitted that he had hoped Stalin would turn out to be an «industrialized Napoleon» to whom Kojève himself would play Hegel – that is, be Stalin's «self-consciousness». Only now had he realized that Stalin (and Hitler) had meant nothing new – world historically speaking. The Second World War as such also had «brought nothing essentially new. And the First had only been an intermezzo anyway»<sup>27</sup>.

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24 Schmitt to Jünger, 26th January 1957, in H. Kiesel (ed.), *Ernst Jünger-Carl Schmitt: Briefe 1930-1983*, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 1999, p. 320.

25 C. Schmitt, *Nehmen/Teilen/Weiden: Ein Versuch, die Grundfragen jeder Sozial- und Wirtschaftsordnung vom Nomos her richtig zu stellen 1953*, in *Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924 - 1954: Materialien zu einer Verfassungslehre*, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1958, pp. 489-501.

26 Kojève to Schmitt, 16th May 1955; reprinted in Piet Tommissen (ed.), *Schmittiana, Vol. VI*, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1998, p. 103.

27 *Ibidem*, p. 104.

For Kojève, Napoleon had attempted to sublimate [*aufheben*] the state in favour of society through a «total war». Yet, the Anglo-Saxons had long been able to do the same without war, and the entire world was now moving in such a direction of «stateless peace». Kojève agreed with Schmitt that there was no authentic statehood left – administration had replaced proper government, and police work substituted for politics. The global dominance of the Americans only hastened this trend, as they had never known the meaning of war, politics and state<sup>28</sup>. The Soviet Union, however, still remained a step ahead in this development. In Russia the government had been completely and officially replaced by administration – and, Kojève contended, in the West nothing would change fundamentally either, if governments and parliaments were abolished. If the West remained capitalist and nationalist, the Soviet Union was likely to conquer it – if it ceased to be so, the West would be in a better position to abolish the seeming global dualism in its favour.

Either way, the world would one day be uniformly administered, because the world already had a unity of purpose – living peacefully and living prosperously (and, one might add, living playfully, in the way Kojève had outlined the brave new world depicted in his lectures on Hegel). In fact, for Kojève, Molotow's cowboy hat was a symbol of the future<sup>29</sup>. «After ten to twenty years – he claimed – even a non-Hegelian will notice that East and West not only want *the same* (apparently since Napoleon), but are also *doing* the same»<sup>30</sup>. The universal homogeneous state, then, was no proper state at all in the Schmittian sense – that is, a political entity charged with correctly identifying friends and enemies on the outside and ensuring peace on the inside. Rather, it was a global mechanism for the universal satisfaction of human needs – a world-wide «Sunday of life» indeed. In Kojève's account, this state would emerge through a gradual process of transnational constitutionalization, that is, a homogenization of private and public law across different nation-states, and, ultimately, a judicial union based on a common conception of justice. The rule of law could also only be fully realized in the universal homogeneous state, in which, after all, politics, understood as potentially deadly conflict between states, would no longer subordinate law in moments of exception. Thus, the full realization of the rule of law, or *Rechtsstaat*, required the abolition of the nation-state<sup>31</sup>.

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28 *Ibidem*.

29 Kojève to Schmitt, 11th July 1955, p. 110.

30 Kojève to Schmitt, 16th May 1955, in *Ibidem*, p. 105.

31 A. Kojève, *Outline of a Phenomenology of Right*, trans. Bryan-Paul Frost and Robert Howse; ed. Bryan-Paul Frost, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. The full legal implications of Kojève's thought are lucidly explained in the introductory essay by Frost and Howse.

Schmitt, who also felt that he had all «exempt papers of the world spirit», agreed that the state, the «mortal god» as it had been known in Europe since early modern times, was indeed dead. It had become – and here Schmitt used a term his pupil Ernst Forsthoff had coined in the 1930s – a mere provider of *Daseinsvorsorge*, that is, social security<sup>32</sup>. But he disagreed with Kojève's point that the Cold War dualism was a prologue to the proper unity of the world. Instead, it was a phase between the age of European states and a new era of great spaces. The globe, Schmitt claimed, was not yet a unit for economic and technological planning – and he «left it open whether it ever could be». In other words, Schmitt cast doubt on the very notion of globalized modernity, that Kojève, the self-declared «Marxist of the Right», painted<sup>33</sup>. Great spaces would – and, above all, *should* – constitute a new plurality of *magni homines*, that is, political entities comparable to «great men», who could experience meaningful and – non-moralized – enmity among each other. Only such enmity would then also yield what Schmitt called a «capacity for history», or *Geschichtsfähigkeit*<sup>34</sup>.

Yet Kojève kept disagreeing with Schmitt. The political itself, he argued, would vanish, once and for all. Kojève's criterion of the political was not the possibility of enmity as such, but the possibility of battling for prestige. After all claims for recognition had been satisfied, enmity itself had been overcome and preserved at the same time in the act of recognition. Enmity was merely one moment in the Hegelian dialectic – not the perennial element constitutive of political (and sometimes, it seemed, personal) identity which it appeared to be for Schmitt. Conflict might not disappear at any point soon – but at one point meaningful conflict could be brought to an end once and for all, as no rational political alternatives to the world state could be constructed.

For Schmitt, on the other hand, such a final resolution or synthesis was simply unavailable. A system in which all meaningful opposition – and therefore all moral substance – was dissolved, a system, in other words, that no longer required what Schmitt had always called a sophisticated moral decision, had to be anathema for the philosophical conservative Schmitt. No wonder then that he anxiously inquired with Kojève whether there could be an enemy at all in Hegel, «given that he, the enemy, is either a necessary transitional stage of the negation, or else void and without essence?»<sup>35</sup> Kojève's answer was indeed placid and predictable: «As always, yes and

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32 Schmitt to Kojève, 7th June 1955, in Tommissen (ed.), *Schmittiana*, Vol. IV, p. 108.

33 D. Auffret, *Alexandre Kojève*, cit., p. 305.

34 Schmitt to Kojève, 7th June 1955, in Tommissen (ed.), *Schmittiana*, Vol. IV, p. 109.

35 Schmitt to Kojève, 14th July 1955, in *Ibidem*, p. 113.

no. Yes – insofar and so long as there is struggle for recognition, that is, history. World history is the history of enmity between men . . . No – insofar and as soon as history ... is “sublated” in absolute knowledge»<sup>36</sup>. Kojève, in short, did not concede any essential human need for struggle or enmity. There was only a need for recognition – a need that could be rationally satisfied in the universal homogeneous state.

For Schmitt, Kojève’s vision could ultimately be nothing but a dystopia. It meant not only the end of the political – it also meant the end of any moral seriousness and any notion of transcendence. Kojève’s world was one of complete immanence – a wholly man-made artefact in which not only history, but also theology had necessarily vanished. It was also a world in which the «seamless functioning» of technology combined with an aesthetic and in fact Romantic play with the merely interesting. It was in fact only consistent, then, that Kojève defined the «end of History», among other things, as the «end of theology»<sup>37</sup>.

Kojève did not necessarily disagree with any of Schmitt’s evaluations of the end of History – he simply appeared to view that end with equanimity.<sup>38</sup> And in fact, subsequent to his encounter with Schmitt, he went even further afield – geographically and philosophically. After a trip of «philosophical tourism» to Japan in 1959, he decided that Japanese society presented yet another world-historical option, one that could be superior even to the American (or the Soviet) way of life<sup>39</sup>. The Japanese, Kojève now contended, had invented a snobbism for the masses or what Kojève called «democratic snobbism». This meant a mixture of superficial democratisation and Americanisation, which had resulted from Japan’s reluctant opening to the West on the one hand and a fundamental continuity of home-grown

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36 Kojève to Schmitt, 4th January 1956, in *Ibidem*, p. 115. See also Tihanov, *Regimes of Modernity*, p. 85.

37 Edmond Ortigues, *Pour l’honneur d’Alexandre Kojève*, in «Le Monde», 4th October 1999.

38 A profoundly playful and self-consciously provocative man, Kojève probably quite purposefully exaggerated his differences with Schmitt in their correspondence. After all, in 1945, in preparation to his work as a diplomat, Kojève had outlined a scheme of multiple empires, each animated by different fundamental principles - a scheme in certain respects not dissimilar to Schmitt’s conception of *Grossräume*, as empires were also to be based on particular concepts. In this «sketch», France was supposed to be the leading part of an empire spiritually and intellectually based on «Latinity» and geographically centred on the Mediterranean. The spiritual affinities of the members of the Latin Empire, were centred on an appreciation of beauty and the art of living. The «humanization of leisure» was of course a particularly important project for humanity as a whole. See Alexandre Kojève, *L’Empire Latin: Esquisse d’une doctrine de la politique française (27 août 1945)*, in «La règle du jeu», Vol. 1., No. 1, 1990, pp. 89-123.

39 L. Niethammer (in collaboration with Dirk van Laak), *Posthistoire: Has History come to an End?*, London, Verso, 1993.

traditions on the other. In particular, a thoroughly de-politicized samurai tradition could provide the elite with an aesthetic re-enactment of meaningful traditions, or even agonal play, without disturbing the seamless functioning of modern technology and bureaucracy. Schmitt, in an article on Rousseau in 1962, eventually conceded that «in the welfare state, in the society of consumption, with its automation and abundance, a philosophy of play seems to be timely, or rather, a philosophy of leisure time. But the player is not a world-historical figure»<sup>40</sup>.

## Meanings of the World State

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Kojève was not the only intellectual – and not even the only dandy – who put forward a vision of the world state in the late 1950s. Ernst Jünger, one of Schmitt's «hostile brothers», also offered a slim volume on *Der Weltstaat*, in which he argued that the world state was born out of the spirit of technological innovation – in particular a general *accelerando*, a further acceleration of modernity<sup>41</sup>. Like Schmitt and Kojève, he contended that

... old pictures fade away, old meanings become empty, of the historical state and its claims, above all. That is the reason why wars become suspicious, its limits questionable. What enters now explodes its norms<sup>42</sup>

But Jünger clearly was mindful of his old friend Schmitt when he also claimed that

the planetary order has been accomplished already, both in terms of type and furnishing. All that is missing is its recognition, its declaration. It would be thinkable through a spontaneous act . . . or also forced through convincing facts. Always, poetry, the poets have to go first. The further expansion of great spaces into a global order, the world states into the one world state, or, rather, the world empire, is connected to the concern that now this

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40 C. Schmitt, *Dem wahren Johann Jakob Rousseau: Zum 28. Juni 1962*, in «Zürcher Woche», 29th June 1962. Schmitt continued: «Rousseau himself was no player either. His ideal was a democracy which proves itself in severe frugality. Such ideals, which amount to a renunciation of consumption are also outdated nowadays. Not even the Albanians would permanently put up with something like this».

41 E. Jünger, *Der Weltstaat: Organismus und Organisation*, Stuttgart, Klett, 1960, cit., p. 9.

42 *Ibidem*, p. 31.

perfection will exact its cost in terms of freedom of the will. Especially for this reason, there are many who advocate a world divided into three or more parts<sup>43</sup>.

In other words, *everybody* in this «post-European debate» on global order agreed that meaning arose from tension, or, more precisely, from struggle – only that Kojève had resigned himself to the cessation of both at the level of deadly intensity. Schmitt, on the other hand, thought that struggle could and *should* be preserved. Jünger was even looking for a cosmic antithesis, as the world state would shift the borders to outer space, while Schmitt desperately clung to his vision of earthly great spaces.

There was another – indirect – intervention in this debate which clarified what was at stake between Schmitt and Kojève. Leo Strauss, in a 1948 letter to the «civil servant of the world spirit» claimed that «no one had made the case for modern thought in our time as brilliantly as you»<sup>44</sup>. Yet he also politely begged to differ with Kojève's image of the universal homogeneous state. Strauss claimed that «the fact that great deeds are impossible in the End-State, can lead precisely the best to a nihilistic denial of the End-State»<sup>45</sup>. Such a state, he suspected, would also turn out to be a tyranny. Moreover, universality and homogeneity as such, he argued, would never satisfy human beings. Strauss then advanced his own – somewhat paradoxical – view that only wisdom would satisfy and that consequently wisdom had to be «popularized»<sup>46</sup>. Irrespective of that, Strauss concluded that Kojève offered a vision of nihilist, rather than liberal, modernity – and that liberals and antiliberals had reason to object to his peculiar Hegelianism. Such supposed nihilism – and particularly the impossibility of great politics between *magni homines* – was of course precisely what horrified Schmitt.

In the late 1950s, then, the prospect of a world state, or, perhaps more accurately, world society, caused anxieties not only for Schmitt, but for thinkers as different as Jünger and Strauss. The suspicion of universal empire that runs so deep in Western political thought affected not only those who associated the end of history and politics with a loss of meaning and substance. Even philosophical liberals could

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43 *Ibidem*, p. 73.

44 Strauss to Kojève, 22nd August 1948, in Leo Strauss, *On Tyranny*, eds. Victor Gourevitch and Michael S. Roth, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2000, p. 236.

45 *Ibidem*, p. 238.

46 *Ibidem*.

argue that the joke in Kojève's comedy would be at humanity's expense. After all, the world state would imply the end of genuine moral conflict – and therefore the end of genuine moral autonomy<sup>47</sup>. Yet, the choice was not simply between politics and play. After all, Kojève could only claim that the universal and homogeneous state would spell the end of politics, because he had de facto adopted Schmitt's definition of the political. Politics as non-deadly disagreement could of course continue – but there were no longer alternative models to satisfy the human need for recognition. In Kojève's account, any action provoking deadly conflict would become a matter for the police, rather than politics.

### **Aron versus Schmitt: Reclaiming the Autonomy of Politics**

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A liberal thinker on international relations – and the supposedly «most cosmopolitan French intellectual of his time» – stood between Schmitt and Kojève<sup>48</sup>. Raymond Aron had not only read Schmitt's *Nomos* «with profit», as he claimed in a letter to Schmitt in 1954<sup>49</sup>. He had also attended Kojève's seminars in the 1930s and had been asked by Kojève for a final summing-up and commentary at the very last session of the seminar in 1939<sup>50</sup>. After the War, Kojève kept sending Aron copies of his memos for French government (in fact, Schmitt, the man most preoccupied with power, was the only of the three interlocutors who had none. He dedicated his small

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47 See also R. Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 226-34.

48 T. Judt, *The Burden of Responsibility: Blum, Camus, Aron and the French Twentieth Century*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998, cit., p. 144.

49 Aron to Schmitt, 14th January 1954 (HStAD -- RW 265-517). For the relationship between Schmitt and Aron in general, see Piet Tommissen, 'Raymond Aron face à Carl Schmitt', in Piet Tommissen (ed.), *Schmittiana, Vol. VII*, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2001, pp. 111-29. Aron had supervised the thesis of Julien Freund, a former Resistance fighter and subsequent Schmitt pupil, on 'the essence of the political' – a thesis which Aron supposedly would have wanted to write himself in one form or another. Freund had initially been supervised by Jean Hyppolite, who, after he had realized that Freund centred his argument on the friend-enemy distinction, had recommended that Freund rather approach Aron. At the defence, Hyppolite concluded his intervention with the words: «If you are right, nothing remains for me but to commit suicide». The rapporteur at the defence, Paul Ricoeur, was almost equally critical, but all examiners commended Freund for his «courage». See Nicolas Baverez, *Raymond Aron: Un Moraliste au Temps des Idéologies*, Paris, Flammarion, 1993, pp. 325-6. See also Julien Freund, *L'essence du politique*, Paris, Sirey, 1965, and Gary Ulmen, 'Reflections of a Partisan: Julien Freund (1921-1993)', in «Telos», No. 102, 1995, pp. 3-10.

50 According to Piet Tommissen in *Schmittiana, Vol. VI*, pp. 92. See also Raymond Aron, *Mémoires 1983*, Paris, Julliard, 1993, pp. 94-101.



volume on the problem of «access to power» to Kojève with the words: whoever has no power needs sweets)<sup>51</sup>.

Aron no doubt had been fascinated by Kojève's vision, but his thinking had also evolved in such a manner that he had to see both Kojève and his German adversary as making *political* misjudgments. The man who called himself an «engaged spectator» grappling with questions of political choice and conscience could only view Kojève and Schmitt as *disengaged* spectators. Both their visions, in different ways, left no room for individual political responsibility<sup>52</sup>. After all, Kojève could only cast a disengaged ironic glance at world history – even if he himself turned out to be a crafty actor in the international politics of post-war Europe. Schmitt, on the other hand, hoped for the recovery of genuine historical agency on the part of great spaces – and, presumably, great statesmen, whose «great politics» would generate or regenerate the meaning that would be lost for good with Kojève's end of History.

Many of Aron's central observations and judgements were ostensibly similar to what Schmitt had to say on international law and politics, with both men united in what Schmitt had called «la recherche de la réalité». In fact, while he was always careful to keep his distance from Schmitt and apparently met Schmitt only once, Aron had great respect for the *savant allemand* in the tradition of Max Weber. He was even instrumental in having his works published in French. According to Aron, as a «man of high culture» Schmitt could not have been a «Hitlerian» and had not joined the Nazi party (here the usually well-informed Aron had it wrong)<sup>53</sup>. While he had still refused to contribute to a Festschrift for Schmitt in the late 1960s, he later allowed the editors of another *liber amicorum* to include in the preface a reference to Aron's «best wishes» for Schmitt on his ninetieth birthday<sup>54</sup>. Above all, it is clear from Aron's exchanges with his student Julien Freund, who often acted as a go-between the two men, that Aron was anxious to know what Schmitt really thought of his work<sup>55</sup>.

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51 T. Paléologue, *Carl Schmitt et Alexandre Kojève: Une anecdote, une conférence et autres miettes*, in «Commentaire», No. 87, Autumn 1999, pp. 567-73; here p. 568.

52 R. Aron, *Le spectateur engagé: Entretiens avec Jean-Louis Missika et Dominique Wolton*, Paris, Julliard, 1981.

53 R. Aron, *Mémoires*, Paris, Julliard, 1993, p. 650.

54 Tommissen, *Raymond Aron face à Carl Schmitt*, p. 125.

55 Letters from Freund to Aron, Archives Privées Raymond Aron, carton No. 38 and carton No. 206. Aron had written to Freund on 17th April 1967: «En toute franchise, je n'envisage pas de collaborer au volume en l'honneur de Carl Schmitt. Vous savez quelle est mon attitude en ces sortes de questions. Je ne juge personne et je laisse à d'autres le soin de prononcer des condamnations catégoriques. Tout de même, j'ai vécu la période des années 30 et je ne puis pas oublier le rôle que Carl Schmitt a joué, volontairement ou involontairement, consciemment ou inconsciemment. Mon admiration pour la personne est grande et j'ai

For Aron, international relations were likely to remain driven by what he called the forces of «Power, Glory and Ideas»<sup>56</sup>. They were also likely to remain irreducibly political and morally complex. This was not because politics and morality were polar opposites, so that any mixture of the two would lead to the catastrophes which Schmitt foresaw, but because morality was deeply woven into the fabric of political life - alongside numerous other threads. Aron shared Schmitt's view that international and domestic politics were becoming increasingly intertwined - and, above all, ideological. But he was also concerned to bring out the crucial differences in their perspectives.

In 1963, Aron wrote a long letter to Schmitt, in which he put his finger on the essential ambiguity - and perhaps even hypocrisy - of Schmitt's position. With his customary «icy clarity»<sup>57</sup>, he suggested that one had to ask oneself whether Schmitt's thought was not «pulled in two directions simultaneously. On the one hand, the conflicts between men are existential ...and essentially violent, and not susceptible to arbitrage...». But «on the other hand - he continued - you keep a nostalgia for the public European law where the state establishes internal peace, solely determining the external enemy ... But even in terms of your own philosophy, European public law was nothing but and could have been nothing but an admirable, but precarious work of art. To use my language, the European system had to be homogeneous ... These sociological conditions require a conjunction rare and transitory»<sup>58</sup>.

In other words, what Schmitt wanted was neither consistent with his own existentialist-cum-religious demands on politics, nor could it actually be engineered in any manner<sup>59</sup>. International relations remained a realm of historical contingency in

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entretenu avec lui des relations intermittentes depuis la guerre, mais la collaboration à un volume de ce genre est un hommage à une personnalité, hommage que je ne puis pas malgré tout lui rendre». *Ibidem*.

56 R. Aron, *Paix et guerre entre les nations*, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1962.

57 The expression «icy clarity» is François Mauriac's. Quoted in Judt, *The Burden*, cit., p. 164.

58 Aron to Schmitt, 1st October 1963 (HStAD RW 265-521).

59 Aron also seemed to view Schmitt's theory of land and sea with considerable scepticism. Schmitt had sent Aron «a poem by Goethe from 1812 - a tremendous anticipation of the terrane counter-position to Mackinder's maritime position». The poem about Napoleon, *Ihro der Kaiserin von Frankreich Majestät*, ended with the lines:

Nur Meer und Erde haben hier Gewicht;  
Ist jenem erst das Ufer abgewonnen,  
Daß sich daran die stolze Woge bricht,  
So tritt durch weisen Schluß, durch Machtgefechte  
Das feste Land in alle seine Rechte.

which responsible political action required working with the constellations at hand. It also required working with the moral demands which had made their way into public international discourse. A return to duelling and chivalry, which remained Schmitt's (and Jünger's) ideals for international politics, could only be quixotic – and politically dangerous.

More importantly even, Aron, for all his «admiration of the grand jurist» Schmitt, left no doubt that he felt Schmitt's account of the *ius publicum Europeum* and the degeneration of international politics in the twentieth century deeply disingenuous<sup>60</sup>. Proper distinctions had to be drawn between «biologically absolute enmity (the Jews for the Hitlerians)», «politically absolute enmity (Carthage for Cato)» and ideologically absolute enmity (Lenin's doctrine)<sup>61</sup>. But only what in his book on Clausewitz he was point out more bluntly that

only 'Ludendorff-Hitler' gave a precise meaning to what Carl Schmitt calls 'absolute hostility' – what neither the authors of the Versailles Treaty nor the Marxist-Leninists nor the Western victors of the Second World War have done. Ludendorff and Hitler posited the racial community as the subject of history and the enemies of this community as transhistorical enemies of the German people, even of all peoples. This hostility, and this only, deserves the term 'absolute', because it logically leads to massacre or to genocide<sup>62</sup>.

On a conceptual plane, Aron also rejected the connection Schmitt had made between absolute war, in Clausewitz's sense, and the «criminalization of war».<sup>63</sup> And on an ideological level, Aron distinguished between a hostility based on racism, which necessarily had to become absolute, and Communist class warfare. The latter had not been any less extreme or cruel than biologist aggression. But «for those who seek to «save the concepts» there remains a difference between a philosophy

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Aron replied: «Les vers de Goethe sont impressionnants, mais dès lors que l'empire continental se confond avec la parfaite tyrannie, je me sense, pour mon compte, converti, à la mer» Schmitt noted in the margins: «Il n'y a pas de "convertir"; il s'agit d'un fait élémentaire, vis-à-vis lequel toute convertibilité évanait et s'évanait». Schmitt to Aron, 18th March 1954, Archives Privées Raymond Aron, carton no. 208, and Aron to Schmitt, 26th March 1954 (HStAD – RW 265 - 518). Of course, the implication could be that for Schmitt, on an "elemental level", the Jew Aron had to be with the 'sea powers' in any case.

60 Aron to Schmitt, 14th January 1954 (HStAD -- RW 265-517).

61 Aron to Schmitt, 1st October 1963.

62 R. Aron, *Penser la guerre*, Clausewitz, Vol. 2, *L'âge planétaire*, Paris, Gallimard, 1976, p. 217.

63 *Ibidem*, p. 215.

whose logic *is* monstrous and that which lends itself to a monstrous interpretation»<sup>64</sup>. Aron, then, had seen through the tendentious readings of international law which Schmitt offered. And, in fact following Schmitt's injunction to analyze against which concrete enemy particular concepts were directed, the Frenchman had identified Schmitt's real targets – and therefore also his blind spots «Ludendorff-Hitler».

Aron was no less concerned than Schmitt about the fragility and potential frailties of liberal polities – after all, he had witnessed the last years of the Weimar Republic as a visiting student in Germany from 1930 to 1933<sup>65</sup>. But he understood where to draw the line between genuine worries about the amount of order necessary to render liberalism viable and a fixation on the past which could suddenly flip over into existentialism or apocalyptic, definitive solutions to political predicaments. More clearly than many others, he saw the counter-revolutionary and counter-Enlightenment temperament at work in Schmitt's writings.

Not surprisingly, Aron reaffirmed that that «la finalité de la politique est l'amitié» in correspondence with Julien Freund, who felt caught between his two masters, Aron and Schmitt<sup>66</sup>. In particular, this was a response to a letter by Freund, in which his student had realized that if one gave priority to enmity, rather than friendship, it became «quasi impossible» to resolve the problem of the «*finalité de la politique*»<sup>67</sup>. In contrast to Kojève – and, in fact, also other liberals, such as Friedrich von Hayek – Aron then pointed out that 'as long as there are wars, belonging to a political order will be equivalent to discriminating between friends and enemies'.<sup>68</sup> But what might have appeared as a purely Schmittian statement was a fact, not a value. In front of Schmitt, Aron denied the existential import of the political. He also stressed that the world-historical clock could not be turned back. Once moral claims had become part of world politics, one could not simply revert to an a-moral or 'de-moralized' system of great spaces.

## Conclusion

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64 *Ibidem*, p. 218.

65 T. Judt, *The Burden*, cit., p. 149.

66 Aron to Freund, 5th February 1964, Archives Privées Raymond Aron, carton No. 206.

67 Freund to Aron, 3rd February 1964, *Ibidem*.

For the three interlocutors Schmitt, Kojève and Aron, the fate of Europe was a background question to all their considerations on global order at the height of the Cold War. Schmitt in particular on the one hand lamented the seemingly inexorable decline of European conservative elites, but, on the other, held out some desperate hope for a multipolar world in which Europe could play a leading role among *magni hominess* with some dignity. Kojève was content, if not excited, by the prospect of a world in which any emphatic concept of Europe – as in Schmitt – had disappeared; a world, in other words, which had become all America, or perhaps Japan<sup>69</sup>.

However, the diagnoses and prescriptions of the three spectators of global politics also reflected deeper philosophical disagreements. Kojève and Aron, for all the 'tragic realism' that has sometimes been attributed to Aron and the authoritarian tendencies associated with Kojève, were *philosophical* liberals, with a firm belief in universal human equality<sup>70</sup>. Aron, more so than Kojève, of course - or even Schmitt - made the idea of «antinomy» basic to his political thought. What has been called his «moderate Machiavellianism» was tailored to allow for liberal political action in the circumstances of modernity. Kojève, on the other hand, was confident that the end of History would allow for a responsible, and yet playful, role of counsellor to the Prince.

The disturbing fact, however, remains that Schmitt's analysis of the *ius publicum Europaeum*, perhaps really had uncovered a certain logic at the heart of liberal political modernity. Much of this analysis had been stylized, selective or just plain inaccurate. In particular, it was in fact the theologians who emphasized moral constraints on state action, whereas their opponents, the humanists, advocated a large degree of state autonomy and allowed pre-emptive strikes out of fear.<sup>71</sup> A common moral fabric among European political actors was torn apart by the *silette Theologi!* which Schmitt supposedly cherished. Instead, self-assertion and self-empowerment came to characterize the international realm, in which an analogy of modern individuals and *magni hominess* was played out. In short, as Richard Tuck

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68 R. Aron, *In Defense of Political Reason: Essays by Raymond Aron*, ed. D. J. Mahoney, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 1994, p. 84.

69 C. Altini, *Fino alla Fine del Mondo Moderno: La Crisi della Politica nelle Lettere di Carl Schmitt e Alexandre Kojève*, in «Filosofia Politica», Vol. 17, 2003, pp. 209-222; here p. 219.

70 For an analysis of Aron in this light, see S. Launay, *La pensée politique de Raymond Aron*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1995.

71 R. Tuck, *The Rights*, cit., pp. 227-8.

has pointed out, the international arena turned into a laboratory for testing liberal political ideas<sup>72</sup>.

Yet, if the *ius publicum Europaeum* was in fact at least partly a liberal invention, then the fact that it depended on free spaces for conquest and colonization is all the more unsettling. Max Weber, when despairing about the future of freedom under conditions of «high capitalism», had already mentioned as one of the preconditions of the emergence of modern liberty «overseas expansion». He went on to claim that «in the armies of Cromwell, in the French constituent assembly, in our whole economic life even today this breeze from across the ocean is felt . . . but there is no new continent at our disposal»<sup>73</sup>.

Schmitt thought that liberal universalism, when implemented, would always either be impotent – or betray its very ideals by stoking endless wars in the name of values such as peace and justice. Instead, Schmitt, in the name of morality, sought to retain the old liberal *ius publicum Europaeum* – and restrain liberalism at the practical political level. This «moral restraining» had two reasons: one was that the old duelling did provide existential meaning and satisfactions; the other that a fully liberal international order would not only be unstable, but also cause more violence than a system of *Grossräume*. Even if an order of *Grossräume* did not emerge, Schmitt felt that a seemingly uniform world would require a freely available and contestable outside to be stable. It was only logical, then, that he could occasionally imagine a *Weltraumnahme*, an appropriation of outer space, instead of a *Landnahme*, in case the United States came to exercise global domination<sup>74</sup>.

The question then remained whether a world without a political outside or an internal frontier was even thinkable politically. Was the fact that the ideals of philosophical liberalism seemed to be at least partially realized at the domestic level, but contrasted with an apparently illiberal world at the practical international level a matter that would be remedied with the end of History? Or was this not merely a question of practical inconsistency or hypocrisy, but rather an indication of deep complicity? In the end, Kojève alone gave a clear answer: only a transnational and even «transpolitical» realization of the rule of law in practice would be consistent with philosophical liberalism – and with human nature.

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72 *Ibidem*, p. 229.

73 Quoted by H. H. Gerth, C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, London, Routledge, 1995, pp. 71-72.

74 See also Carl Schmitt, *Die legale Weltrevolution: Politischer Mehrwert als Prämie auf juristische Legalität und Superlegalität*, in «Der Staat», Vol. 17, 1978, pp. 321-39.

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